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The principle of double effect—also known as the rule of double effect; the doctrine of double effect, often abbreviated as DDE or PDE, double-effect reasoning; or simply double effect—is a set of ethical criteria which Christian philosophers, and some others, have advocated for evaluating the permissibility of acting when one's otherwise legitimate act (for example, relieving a terminally ill patient's pain) may also cause an effect one would normally be obliged to avoid (sedation and a slightly shortened life). Double-effect originates in Thomas Aquinas' treatment of homicidal self-defense, in his work ''Summa Theologica''.〔(''Summa Theologiae, IIa-IIae Q. 64, art. 7 )〕 This set of criteria states that an action having foreseen harmful effects practically inseparable from the good effect is justifiable if the following are true: * the nature of the act is itself good, or at least morally neutral; * the agent intends the good effect and not the bad either as a means to the good or as an end itself; * the good effect outweighs the bad effect in circumstances sufficiently grave to justify causing the bad effect and the agent exercises due diligence to minimize the harm.〔T. A. Cavanaugh, ''Double-Effect Reasoning: Doing Good and Avoiding Evil'', p.36, Oxford: Clarendon Press〕 ==Intentional harm versus side effects== Although different writers state and employ double effect differently, they share the position that consequentially similar acts having different intentional structures make for ethically different acts. So, for example, advocates of double effect typically consider the intentional terror bombing of non-combatants having as its goal victory in a legitimate war morally out of bounds, while holding as ethically in bounds an act of strategic bombing that similarly harms non-combatants with foresight but without intent as a side effect of destroying a legitimate military target. Because advocates of double effect propose that consequentially similar acts can be morally different, double effect is most often criticized by consequentialists who consider the consequences of actions entirely determinative of the action's morality. In their use of the distinction between intent and foresight without intent, advocates of double effect make three arguments. First, that intent differs from foresight, even in cases in which one foresees an effect as inevitable. Second, that one can apply the distinction to specific sets of cases found in military ethics (terror bombing/strategic bombing), medical ethics (craniotomy/hysterectomy), and social ethics (euthanasia). Third, that the distinction has moral relevance, importance, or significance. The doctrine consists of four conditions that must be satisfied before an act is morally permissible: # The ''nature-of-the-act condition.'' The action must be either morally good or indifferent. # The ''means-end condition.'' The bad effect must not be the means by which one achieves the good effect. # The ''right-intention condition.'' The intention must be the achieving of only the good effect, with the bad effect being only an unintended side effect. # The ''proportionality condition.'' The bad effect must not be disproportionate to the good effect. The second of these four conditions is an application of the more general principle that good ends do not justify evil means.〔(Mark Timmons, ''Moral Theory: An Introduction'' (Rowman & Littlefield 2003 ISBN 978-0-8476-9768-7), p. 80 )〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Principle of double effect」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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